Renewable Energy Taskforce Pilot Program for the Procurement of SRECs Updated May 2, 2012

Priority Questions for the Taskforce to Consider:

 What should be the process for making future decisions that have competitive implications, such as allocating SREC quantities among tiers and setting prices?

Design Goals:

1. Minimize costs

 How can the program be designed to minimize ratepayer costs given the other objectives set forth in REPSA?

2. Maximize in-state generation and manufacturing

 How can the program be designed with regard to the objective of "maximizing in-state solar renewable energy generation and local manufacturing," recognizing that REPSA includes 10% bonus provisions for in-state workforce and manufactured content?

3. Market Stability

- How can we avoid boom/bust cycles?
- How do we meet long term targets?
- How can we stay under price caps?
- How do we avoid structural oversubscription?

Design Elements:

1. Tier size and allocation		Straw-man proposal
A.	Should procurements continue to be by	
	tier?	
В.	If so, how many should there be?	
C.	What should be the dividing line between	
	different tiers?	
D.	Is tiering by size only for "new" systems?	
E.	If so, what defines "new"?	
F.	If so, how much of the total amount goes	
	to "new" systems?	

2. Pricing	Straw-man proposal
A. Should SREC prices be set by competitive bidding, administratively-set pricing, or some combination of the two? If administratively-set pricing will be used again, what has been learned from the Pilot Program that would be useful in future determinations of prices? Is the Green Energy Fund grant (or equivalent) enough of an adder?	Prices for smaller systems could be linked to auction prices in larger tiers by a percentage or fixed amount.

B. Treatment of systems with different grant	
values: How to estimate? Is it any for	
administratively set or all bids? Different	
programs have different grant amounts.	
C. Treatment of systems by vintage?	

3. Long	term contracts	Straw-man proposal
A.	What tiers and vintages should get long	
	term contracts?	
B.	What should be the contract length? (7,	
	10, 15, 20 years?)	
C.	What happens to SRECs after the	
	contract?	
D.	How to ensure production in later years?	
	(Enforcement? Low prices?)	
E.	Minimum production requirement with	
	penalties for under-production?	

4. Auction structure	Straw-man proposal
A. Why should owners bid through an aggregator?	Optional, not required.
B. Is there sufficient site control to prevent speculation?	As is.
C. Market dominance issues.	As is. Dale Davis: If procurement structure changes this may need re-visiting.
D. Meeting statutory objective of "maximizing in-state solar renewable energy generation and local manufacturing."	

5. Overall size of the next procurement and impacts on future years	Straw-man proposal
A. How many SRECs should be procured in total relative to projected need for SRECs (including concerns of boom/bust, 3 rd party transfer contracts, and cost caps)?	
B. How to address uncertainty and delay with 3 rd party contract data?	
C. How many auctions to have in the next compliance year?	

6. Existing Systems (pre-Dec. 2010	Straw-man proposal
interconnection)	
A. How should consideration be give	en to pre-
existing solar installations in Delay	ware?
B. Should existing systems get mediu	um-long
term contracts vs. annual purchas	ses?

C.	Should existing systems be allocated a	
	percentage of SRECs?	
D.	Should existing systems be competitively	
	bid vs. administratively set prices?	
E.	What happens to existing systems	
	(connected after Dec. 2010) that didn't get	
	a contract in the Pilot 1.0?	
F.	Will future procurements have any	
	distinction by installation date?	
G.	Should there be differential treatment re	
	Del. labor, manufacturing bonus for	
	existing vs. new systems?	